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In the

Supreme Court of the State of Utah
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
vs.

Case No.
8533

ALBERT EDMUND BARLOW,
Defendant and Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF FACTS
On October 31, 1955, the defendant was charged with
the offense of unlawful cohabitation in violation of Section
76-53-2, U. C. A. 1953. He waived preliminary hearing
and an information was filed on December 23, 1955. A bill
of particulars was demanded on December 31, 1955 and
supplied January 13, 1956, along with an amended information. Defendant filed a motion to quash which was heard
on January 19, 1956, and denied. D~fendant then entered
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a plea of not guilty, and a jury trial was had March 12 and
13, 1956. The jury returned a verdict of guilty and sentence was imposed March 22, 1956. The defendant appeals
from that conviction and sentence.
The State called 22 witnesses at the trial. The evidence,
including the testimony of those witnesses and the stipulations agreed to, showed that within the period charged in
the information, and concurrently, the defendant: {1) Was
legally married to Amanda Kate Kilgrow Barlow, introduced her to other persons as his wife and was introduced
to other persons by her as her husband; (2) Introduced
Maurine Owen Barlow to other persons as his wife; (3)
Ate his meals in the different homes of Amanda Kate Kilgrow Barlow, Maurine Owen Barlow and Vio Fraser Barlow, respectively; ( 4) Stayed overnight at the homes of
Amanda Kate Kilgrow Barlow and Maurine Owen Barlow
and visited frequently at the home of Vio Fraser Barlow;
( 5) Fathered two children born to Maurine Owen Barlow;
(6) Referred to Maurine Owen Barlow's pregnancy as his
wife's pregnancy; (7) Was present at the birth of one of
the babies born to Maurine Owen Barlow and either stated
to the attending doctor that he was the father, or voiced no
protest when Maurine so stated; (8) Came and went from
the different homes in his automobiles with each of the three
women named in the information and on occasion with all
three at the same time. Upon this and other evidence in
the record, the jury found the defendant guilty of unlawful
cohabitation as charged.
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STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I.
A.
THE STATEMENT OF THE OFFENSE INVOLVED, SECTION 76-53-2, U. C. A. 1953,
CONTAINS AN IMPLIED TIME FACTOR.

B.
THE INFORMATION CHARGES THE DEFENDANT WITH ONLY ONE OFFENSE.

POINT II.
DEFENDANT'S CHALLENGE OF
ORRAN WAS PROPERLY DENIED.

JUROR

POINT III.
THE JURY WAS SUFFICIENTLY INSTRUCTED AS TO THE MEANING OF THE WORD
"COHABIT."
POINT IV.

A.
EVIDENCE DESCRIBING CIRCUMSTANCES
EXISTING PRIOR TO THE TIME OF THE
OFFENSE CHARGED WAS RELEVANT TO
SHOW A CONTINUING CONDITION.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

4

B.
NONE OF THE EVIDENCE COMPLAINED OF
BY DEFENDANT WAS HEARSAY.
POINT V.
THE EVIDENCE IS SUFFICIENT TO SUSTAIN THE CONVICTION.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.

A.
THE STATEMENT OF THE OFFENSE INVOLVED, SECTION 76-53-2, U. C. A. 1953,
CONTAINS AN IMPLIED TIME FACTOR.
Section 76-53-2, U. C. A. 1953, reads in part:
"If any person cohabits with more than one
person of the opposite sex such person is guilty of
a felony."
In his brief defendant argues that the statute does not say
"at the same time" and is therefore ambiguous. He selects
by way of illustration the case of a divorcee or widower
who, within a four year period, marries again and asks
if they have not in fact violated the statute. The answer
is no.
It is fundamental to criminal law that all elements
which constitute an offense must exist concurrently, otherwise the offense is not committed. If, for example, A mar-
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ries X, cohabits with her and holds her out to the world
as his wife, and after her death marries Y, cohabits with
her and holds her out as his wife, how could it be said that
he has violated the statute? At what point, or over what
period of time, has he cohabited: with more than one person
of the opposite sex? At the time he cohabited with X, Y
had not entered the picture, and at the time he cohabited
with Y, X was dead. There is no concurrence of the two
periods of cohabitation and consequently no crime.
The point is illustrated by the familiar requirement
that there is no crime unless the intent and the criminal
act concur. Section 76-1-20, Utah Code Annotated, 1953;
Burdick Law of Crime, Sec. 115. Further illustration lies
in the Code section defining first degree burglary, 76-9-1,
U. C. A. 1953. If B, carrying a satchel full of nitroglycerin,
forcibly breaks and enters in the daytime a structure in
which a safe is kept, and conceals himself until dark, at
which time he blows the safe and takes the money, he presumably is not guilty of first degree burglary because the
breaking and entering was not in the nighttime. Yet nowhere does that section require that all the elements comprising the offense must be present concurrently. That
requirement is implied.
In this case the defendant is charged with cohabiting
with three women from April 30, 1952 to October 31, 1955,
a three and one-half year period. Had the evidence shown
that he cohabited with Amanda Kate Kilgrow Barlow in
1952, Maurin Owen Barlow in 1953, and Vio Fraser Barlow
in 1954, then at no point within the period charged would
he have been cohabiting "with more than one person of the
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opposite sex" but the evidence showed that he cohabited
with all of them concurrently.

B.
THE INFORMATION CHARGES THE DEFENDANT 'VITH ONLY ONE OFFENSE.
Defendant argues next that he is charged with three
offenses because three women were named in the information and there are three possible findings which would
sustain a conviction. The answer is that the offense created
by the Legislature is cohabitation with more than one
person of the opposite sex and proof of concurrent cohabitation with any number from two on up will sustain a conviction.
If the defendant's contention had merit it would be
difficult to uphold, for example, the universally accepted
method of charging and proving the theft of more than one
article in one transaction. The general rule is that where
two or more articles are stolen together the theft may, in
fact must, be charged in one count .. Wharton's Criminal
Law, 12th Edition, Section 1171. The rule is the same even
where the individual articles stolen are separately owned.
State v. McKee, (1898), 17 U. 370, 53 P. 733; State v.
Mickel, (1901), 23 U. 507, 65 P. 484.
Suppose, then, that X steals articles A, B, and C, each
worth $30.00, and is charged in a single count with grand
larceny. The value of the articles stolen is one of the elements of the crime to be proved. State v. Lawrence, ( 1951),
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... U. . .. , 234 P. 2d 600. There is. a dispute in the evidence
on whether the defendant purchased the articles. The jury
returns a verdict of guilty as charged. There is no way
of knowing in such a case whether the jury found that
the defendant stole all three articles or only two of them,
and if only two, which two. Yet it has not successfully been
contended that such a conviction will not stand because the
defendant was charged with three crimes. The reason is
that the Legislature has said that grand larceny is the
felonious stealing, etc. of the personal property of another
of a value in excess of $50.00, and whether the proof shows
it to have been one article or three· articles is immaterial.
The Legislature has likewise said that it shall be a felony
to cohabit with more than one person of the opposite sex
and it doesn't matter how many more than one. It is the
position of the State that the conviction in this case would
be an unconditional bar to a subsequent prosecution for
unlawful cohabitation alleged to have been committed at
the same time as that charged here, whether the women
involved were named in this information or not.

POINT II.
DEFENDANT'S CHALLENGE OF
OHRAN WAS PROPERLY DENIED.

JUROR

On voir dire of the jury panel, it was brought out that
juror Ohran was acquainted with the· defendant, the latter
having done some work as a carpenter for Mr. Ohran some
three years previously (R. 39). The District Attorney later
inquired whether Mr. Ohran during that acquaintance had
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become sufficiently familiar with the defendant's family
life that his judgment might be affected one way or the
other. The record at that point (R. 51) reads:
"MR. OHRAN: No, I didn't know at that time.
Since that time and I guess I have been a little acquainted with it we have had a girl who is in a
similar circumstance work for us and talked about
it.
"MR. ANDERSON: You have no direct knowledge of his family circumstance?
"MR. OHRAN: No, I don't know Mr. Barlow's
family at all."
Defense counsel then challenged lVIr. Ohran for cause and
the court proceeded to make further inquiry in order to
determine whether he was in fact biased. The record continues (R. 52-53) :
"THE COURT: Mr. Ohran, do you have any
knowledge that you would act upon in the trial of
this matter, independent from what the evidence
might or might not show?
"MR. OHRAN: No. I stated I would judge it
on the weight of the evidence, but I do have that
knowledge of several people.
"THE COURT: Whatever knowledge you have
in reference to Mr. Barlow is through hearsay and
gossip that you may have heard?
"MR. OHRAN: And what I have read in the
papers.
"THE COURT: And what you have read in the
papers?
"MR. OHRAN: Yes.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

9

"THE COURT: And at this time do you still
indulge, so far as he is concerned, in the presumption of innocence and presume that he is innocent
until he would be proven guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt?
"MR. OHRAN: Oh, I think I would.
"THE COURT: Well, I mean is your feeling
towards Mr. Barlow at this time that he is presumed
innocent until he is proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt?
"MR. ORRAN: Yes. I would judge that.
"MR. HATCH : I would ask the Court to ask
Mr. Ohran if prior to this time he has formed an
opinion as to Mr. Barlow's present marital status?
"MR. OHRAN: No. Just what has been in the
paper. I think every informed person in reading it
they assume that there is something connected to it.
"THE COURT: Well, Mr. Ohran, you have
served as a juror here many times, haven't you, in
criminal cases?
"MR. OHRAN: Yes sir.
"THE COURT: And you have heard my statement to the effect that the fact the defendant is
charged by the information of the District Attorney
is no evidence of his guilt. Would you treat Mr.
Barlow with that legal proposition in this matter?
"MR. OHRAN: I think I would.
"THE COURT: And the fact that he has been
charged you would not assume from that, that that
was any evidence of his guilt or that he was. guilty?
"MR. OHRAN: No.
"MR. ANDERSON: Your Honor, the State
would resist the challenge that was made. Of course
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we would leave it up to Your Honor but I think in
fairness I should state that.
"MR. HATCH: I should like to ask him one
more question.
"THE COURT: You may.
"MR. HATCH: On what basis do you make
the statement 'That we had a girl working that was
in a similar position or condition' if you have formed
no opinion?
"MR. OHRAN: Well this girl's husband was
put in jail for that about two months ago.
"MR. HATCH : On the basis of that statement
I will renew my motion to challenge for cause.
"THE COURT: Mr. Ohran if you were in the
position of this defendant and the State of Utah
would you be willing to submit your case to eight
men like yourself?
"MR. OHRAN: I think I would.
"THE COURT: I don't think he shows any impartiality."
At no time did Mr. Ohran express an unqualified opinion on the guilt or innocence of the defendant or demonstrate that he had formed such an opinion. On the contrary,
his answers show that any notion he had concerning the
defendant's marital status was the result of newspaper
reading and hearsay. He acknowledged having had conversations with a girl who said her husband had been put in
jail, apparently for the same offense. But the record does
not show, as stated in defendant's brief at page 19, that
"the defendant was 'in the same situation as the husband
of the girl working for him who had been put in jail for
that about two months ago'." The most the record shows
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on this point is that Mr. Ohran was acquainted with people
who had been involved more or less intimately in situations which may have grown out of the offense with which
the defendant was charged.
The defendant's argument that Mr. Ohran was not
impartial cannot stand in the face of the answers given by
him to questions from the court. The above quoted portions
of the record show statements by the challenged juror that
he would act on the evidence produced in court and not on
some other basis (R. 40); that he had no knowledge of the
defendant's family circumstances (R. 51); that he had no
knowledge upon which he would act independent from what
the evidence might show, and that he would judge the matter on the weight of the evidence (R. 52); that he presumed
the defendant to be innocent and would so presume until
it was proved otherwise beyond a reasonable doubt ( R.
52); that he had not formed an opinion as to the defendant's marital status (R. 52) ; that the fact that the defendant was charged with an offense by the District Attorney
would not be any evidence to him of the defendant's guilt
(R. 53), and that if he were in the defendant's position
he would be willing to submit his case to eight men like
himself ( R. 53) .
The trial court's inadvertent statement that Mr. Ohran
showed no impartiality rather than no partiality lends no
support to the defendant's contention. The judge previously
had used the one term for the other but had corrected himself (R. 47, lines 28 to 30), and it is obvious from that which
precedes the statement relied on that the judge meant to
say, I don't think he shows any partiality.
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Our statutes on challenge to the jury support the position of the state on this point. Section 77-30-19, U. C. A.
1953, so far as is pertinent, provides:
"A challenge for implied bias may be taken for
all or any of the following causes and for no other:

* * *
"(8) Having formed or expressed an unqualified opinion or belief as to whether the defendant
is guilty or not guilty of the offense charged."
Section 77-30-21, U. C. A. 1953, states:
"In a challenge for implied bias one or more of
the causes stated in section 77-30-19 must be alleged.
In a challenge for actual bias the cause stated in
section 77-30-18 ( 2) must be alleged ; but no person
shall be disqualified as a juror by reason of having
formed or expressed an opinion upon the matter or
cause to be submitted to such jury founded upon
public rumor, statements in public journals or common notoriety; provided, it appears to the court,
upon his declaration under oath or otherwise, that
he can and will, notwithstanding such opinion, act
impartially and fairly upon the matters submitted
to him. The challenge may be oral, but must be
entered in the minutes of the court or noted by the
reporter."
Upon application of either or both statutes to the facts
of this case it becomes clear that juror Ohran was competent to serve. He had neither formed nor expressed an
unqualified opinion or belief on the defendant's guilt or
innocence, and any tentative opinion he had formed was
based on rumor, newspaper articles or common notoriety.
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It has for years been the law in this state that it is an
unqualified opinion as to the guilt or innocence of an accused which disqualifies a juror and in the absence of such
an opinion he is competent to serve. People v. O'Loughlin
(1882), 3 U. 133, 141, 1 P. 653. This court has further held
that where a juror expresses a willingness to follow the
directions of the court in deciding the issue, he is not disqualified because of prior answers indicating bias. State v.
DeWeese (1918), 51 U. 515, 172 P. 290, 293. In State v.
BeBee (1946), 110 U. 484, 175 P. 2d 478, 482, the O'Loughlin and DeWeese cases were cited with approval and after
discussing the statutes above quoted (U. C. A. 1943 citations), this court held that a juryman who had formed an
opnion based on newspaper articles and rumors was nevertheless competent to render a fair and impartial verdict,
and was properly retained on the panel. See also State v.
Musser (1946), 110 U. 534, 175 P. 2d 724, 738.

Assuming, for purposes of argument, that juror Ohran
had formed a fixed opinion on the marital status of the
defendant, there could have been no prejudice to him. His
marital status was not in issue except with relation to the
rule that a man is presumed to cohabit with his legally
married wife, United States v. Clark (1889), 6 U. 120, 21
P. 463, and the judge omitted to instruct the jury on this
point (R. 237). Moreover, it was stipulated at the trial that
defendant was lawfully married to the Amanda Kate Kilgrow Barlow named in the information (R. 32, 33, Exhibit
1) and there thenceforth was no dispute for the jury on
that point.
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POINT III.
THE JURY WAS SUFFICIENTLY INSTRUCTED AS TO THE MEANING OF THE WORD
"COHABIT."
The defendant maintains that the court erred in failing
to more fully define the word "cohabit" to the jury. This
contention has no merit. Like many other offenses, unlawful cohabitation consists of a course of conduct and the
prohibited course of conduct was explicitly set forth to the
jury in instruction number 5. Further, the word itself has
a usual, generally accepted meaning, presumably familiar
to the jurors and is not a technical word. State v. Barlow
(1944), 107 U. 292. 153 P. 2d 647, 651, and authorities
there cited.
POINT IV.

A.
EVIDENCE DESCRIBING CIRCUMSTANCES
EXISTING PRIOR TO THE TIME OF THE
OFFENSE CHARGED WAS RELEVANT TO
SHO\V A CONTINUING CONDITION.
Defendant complains specifically of Exhibits 36, 37,
38 and 39 and the testimony of Mrs. Annie Roll (R. 159).
In order for the State to prove a case it had to show a course
of conduct by which the defendant was "* * * living,
to all intents and purposes, so far as the public could see,
as husband and wife * * *" with more than one
woman. United States v. Cannon (1885), 4 U. 122, 7 P.
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369. It was thus relevant to show the existence of a household and family being held out to the world with each of
the women named in the information, and the school records
tended to show that relationship. That some of the information shown on the school records (Exhibits 36, 37 and
38) deals with conditions outside the period is immaterial.
The testimony showed that the information was gathered
and the records compiled within the period set forth in the
information.
To the extent that the records deal with a condition
that existed prior to the period charged, such a condition
may be shown where there exists a probability that the
condition continued to exist. On this point Wigmore on
Evidence, 3rd Edition, Section 437, states:
"When the existence of an object, condition,
quality, or tendency at a given time is in issue, the
prior existence of it is in human experience some
indication of its probable persistence or continuance

at a later period."
The hospital records referred to, Exhibit 39, are evidence
of a family relationship between the defendant, Vio Fraser
Barlow and their children prior to and during the period
charged, and other evidence showed that this relationship
continued during the period charged. It is true that defense
counsel objected to their admission as hearsay, but those
entries signed by the defendant were not hearsay, and
counsel's objection was not specific but was addressed to
the group of records. They were therefore properly admitted.
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With respect to the testimony of Mrs. Annie Roll (R.
159-166), it, too, was relevant to show a condition that
existed at one time and which other evidence tended to
show still existed.
Again assuming, for argument, that the exhibits and
testimony complained of were improperly admitted, the
defendant was not prejudiced thereby. It was his theory
in the trial, and is yet, that his course of conduct, to which
the State pointed as evidence of guilt, was entirely innocent by reason of his efforts to fill the role of a father to
his children. His prior conviction for this offense was
admitted and there was no attempt made to conceal the
existence of the family relationships which the school and
hospital records tended to show.
Finally, on the point of relevance, the court instructed
the jury as follows:
"And Instruction No. 10 I have amended to:
You are instructed that the conduct of the defendant
and other persons showing his relationship, if any,
between Kate Amanda Kilgrow, Maurine Owen and
Vio Fraser between April 30, 1952, and the 31st day
of October, 1955, is the only evidence thaat [sic]
can be considered by you in this matter and evidence
of cohabitation during any other period is incompetent and immaterial, and unless you find the defendant to have cohabited with any two or more of
the three women between the dates set forth in the
information you may find the defendant not guilty.
(Instruction No. 10, as amended R. 234.)"
By this instruction the jury were clearly advised of the
evidence they could and could not consider in their deliber-

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

17
ations. There can be no question that the evidence dealing
with conditions prior to April 30, 1952, was considered only
for the proper purposes for which it was introduced.

B.
NONE OF THE EVIDENCE COMPLAINED OF
BY DEFENDANT WAS HEARSAY.
The statements of defendant's daughter, Alhona, testified to by Shirley Broadbent (R. 86-95) were not introduced
testimonially, i. e., to prove the truth of the statement, but
as circumstantial evidence. It was relevant to show who
this girl thought her father and mother were; it was evidence of the family relationship. The hearsay rule is not
applicable to such testimony. Wigmore on Evidence, Third
Edition, Sections 1788 and 1789.

It is alleged that the information contained on Exhibit
15 is hearsay. This exhibit is a photostat of a birth certificate and is admissible as a copy of an official public record
(see discussion on school records, below). But it is worth
noting here that not all relevant parts of the record dealing
with its admission are quoted in defendant's brief. Dr.
Carl Andreasen was the witness on the stand and his testimony begins at R. 146. He testified that he attended the
birth of a child to Maurine Barlow and filled out a certificate of birth. The record then shows ( R. 148) :
"Q. And calling your attention to what has
been marked for identification as State's Exhibit 15
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I will ask you, sir, if that is a photostat of the cer
tificate which you filled out?
"A. It is.
"Q. And where did you obtain the informatior
contained on that certificate?
"A. From the people present during the birU
of this child.
"Q.

"A.

And who were those people?
The defendant and Maurine Barlow.

"Q. And who, sir, is listed as the father of
that child on that certificate?
"A. Albert E. Barlow.
"Q. And from whom did you obtain that information?
"A. I couldn't say whether the man or the
woman that was present gave it to me. I obtained
the information while waiting, which wasn't long.
"Q. And calling your attention to the name of
the mother which appears upon that certificate is
your answer to that the same?
"A. Yes, it is. The maiden name only is listed
on it.
"Q. And this was a female child born March
13th, 1955?
"A. Yes.
"Q. Is that your signature that appears thereon, Doctor?
''A. Yes.
"Q. We will offer at this time, Your Honor,
State's Exhibit 15."

It is clear that aside from the new born baby, only the witness, the defendant and Maurine Barlow were present. If
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the. witness received the information from the defendant,
it was an admission. If he received it from Maurine Barlow,
it was an implied admission. Either alternative is an exception to the hearsay rule.
The objection to the testimony of Mrs. Arpin (R. 168)
has no validity. The name by which other persons refer
to someone is a fact and testimony concerning it is introduced not to prove that it is his correct name but that he
is known by that name. Wigmore, supra, Sections 1788,
1789.
Section 78-25-3, U. C. A. 1953, reads:
"Entries in public or other official books or
records, made in the performance of his duty by a
public officer of this state or by any other person
in the performance of a duty specially enjoined by
the law, are prima facie evidence of the facts stated
therein."
Boards of education were required by law to cause a school
population census to be taken in the spring of 1954 (Laws
of Utah 1953, First Special Session, Chapter 31, Section
1) and the fall of 1955 (Laws of Utah 1955, Chapter 90,
Section 1). Such school census records thus come within
the statute above quoted and are not subject to the hearsay
objection. See Richfield Cottonwood Irrigation Company
v. City of Richfield, (1934), 84 U. 107, 34 P. 2d 945; In Re
Marks (1936), . . . Pa. . .. , 183 Atl. 432; Bozicevich v.
Kenilworth Mercantile Company (1921), 58 U. 458, 199
P. 406.
With respect to the arguments advanced at pages 28
and 29 of defendant's brief concerning alleged inconsisten-
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cies in the court's rulings on exhibits dealing with a period
of time prior to April 30, 1952, it is difficult to understand
the defendant's position. The documents discussed at R.
189, and there admitted into evidence were school records,
not birth certificates, and defense counsel withdrew his
objection to the birth certificates involved at R. 208-212.

POINT V.
THE EVIDENCE IS SUFFICIENT TO SUSTAIN THE CONVICTION.
Viewed as a whole, the testimony of the 22 witnesses
called by the State, the school records, birth certificates,
marriage certificate, contract, hospital records and stipulations entered into constitute an unmistakable mosaic of
guilt on the part of the defendant. As recited in respondent's statement of facts, his conduct over the period of
time set forth in the information added up to only one thing
-the holding out to the world of three women, each as his
wife.
With but very few exceptions, every indication from
which one would normally conclude that his next door
neighbor and the woman living with him are husband and
wife ·was put in evidence in this case with respect to the
defendant and the three women named in the information.
He ate with them, stayed overnight with them, came and
went from the homes with them, introduced them as his
wives and was introduced by them as their husband, directed activities in and around the homes, directed the
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children, transacted important business with them, and
fathered their recently born children in the case of two of
them.
We submit that the State has proved the course of
conduct on defendant's part which the unlawful cohabitation statute prohibits.

CONCLUSION
The judgment of the lower court should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
E. R. CALLISTER,
Attorney General,
K. ROGER BEAN,
Assistant Attorney General,

Attorneys for Plaintiff,
and Respondent.
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